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EVANGELICAL REFORM AND THE PARADOXICAL 
 ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
JOHN W. COMPTON∗ 
The story of how American constitutional law came to recognize a 
right to privacy in matters pertaining to sex and reproduction has been told 
many times.  The most familiar version of the story follows a “whiggish” 
trajectory, and describes a century-long struggle between two fundamental-
ly incompatible philosophies or worldviews.1  The older philosophy held 
that republican government was impossible in the absence of what William 
Novak has called a “well-regulated society”—that is to say, in the absence 
of broadly shared, and legally enforced, moral standards.2  The newer phi-
losophy, which follows the basic contours of John Stuart Mill’s harm prin-
ciple, maintains that the state should permit citizens to follow their own in-
clinations in the realm of sexual intimacy, at least so long as their conduct is 
consensual and does not involve direct harm to others.3 
Over time, we are told, the Millian philosophy gradually displaced the 
older, republican philosophy and its institutional manifestations.  In the tru-
ly whiggish version of the story, the emergence of the modern right to pri-
vacy is celebrated; in critical versions, it is taken as evidence of the nation’s 
social and intellectual decline.4  But in both versions, the journey’s major 
landmarks are the same. 
The first signs of change can be seen in the decades following the Civ-
il War, when a handful of state courts struck down moral laws that were 
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deemed overly restrictive of personal liberty.5  By the end of the century, 
legal commentators from Christopher Tiedeman to Louis Brandeis had en-
dorsed some version of “the right to be let alone”—though this right was 
not always defined in constitutional terms.6  In the 1920s, Justice Brandeis, 
by then a member of the Court, described (in dissent) a constitutionally pro-
tected private sphere that extended to citizens’ “beliefs,” “thoughts,” and 
“emotions.”7  By the early 1970s, the Court had recognized the existence of 
a constitutional right to privacy in “matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”8  And in recent 
decades, the Court has reaffirmed and extended this right, often using lan-
guage that evokes the argument of Mill’s On Liberty.9  In its landmark 2003 
decision invalidating a criminal ban on sodomy, for example, the Court de-
scribed a constitutionally protected “autonomy of self” that includes the 
right to “define the meaning” of one’s “personal relationship[s].”10 
To be sure, scholars who subscribe to the whiggish narrative 
acknowledge that the Court has not always framed its major privacy rulings 
in the language of personal autonomy.  In Griswold v. Connecticut,11 for 
example, the Court invalidated a ban on the dissemination and use of con-
traceptives, not because the law impinged on the right of citizens to choose 
their own paths in matters of sex and reproduction, but because the state 
had failed to respect the associational rights of a specific group of citi-
zens—namely, those who had entered into the “sacred” and “noble” institu-
tion of marriage.12  Perhaps because they fit uneasily in the whiggish narra-
tive, decisions such as Griswold are regularly dismissed as backward-
looking or tradition-bound.13  The clear implication is that these opinions, 
which define the right to privacy in terms of shared values and traditions, 
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are less developmentally significant than their autonomy-based cousins.  
Although decisions such as Griswold inch the ball forward, they are per-
haps best seen as placeholders.  These decisions draw temporary lines in the 
sand, indicating that the Court is attempting simultaneously to accommo-
date social change and limit its constitutional impact.  True constitutional 
development, it seems, occurs only when the Court can be persuaded to 
dispense with the communitarian façade and acknowledge the real motive 
force behind privacy’s rise.14 
Although there is much to be said for the developmental impact of the 
autonomy ideal, this Paper argues that the whiggish narrative ultimately 
fails to provide a complete or accurate account of privacy’s rise.  More spe-
cifically, I contend that constitutional development in the area of sexual pri-
vacy is better understood as an ongoing contest between three, rather than 
two, strands of the American legal/constitutional tradition.  Missing from 
the whiggish narrative is a strand of constitutional thought that I label the 
theory of moral agency.  This perspective on the law-morality relationship, 
which emerged from the evangelical reform movements of the nineteenth 
century, did not question the legitimacy or necessity of morals laws.15  And 
yet its proponents broke with the traditional understanding of the well-
regulated society at three key points.  First, they looked to contemporary 
public opinion—rather than the codified wisdom of the past—to define the 
substantive content of morals laws.  Second, they rejected the traditional 
view that the end of morals regulation was the maintenance of social cohe-
sion rather than the moral improvement of society.  Finally, they held that a 
high degree of individual agency was essential to an effective regime of 
morals police; local and discretionary authority, which counterproductively 
restricted the liberty of morally upstanding citizens, was viewed as an ob-
stacle to moral progress. 
Viewing the rise of modern privacy as a struggle between three strands 
of constitutional thought—the well-ordered society, Millean autonomy, and 
evangelical moral agency—sheds new light on twentieth-century constitu-
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tional development in the area of sexual and reproductive privacy.  In par-
ticular, it seems clear that at least some of the work usually attributed to the 
idea of autonomy (and its proponents) was actually performed by the idea 
of moral agency (and its proponents).  More than mere placeholders for 
Millean autonomy, decisions such as Griswold tapped into a powerful re-
formist tradition that had long viewed individual agency as the surest route 
to a morally upstanding society.  Bringing moral agency into the story also 
has the benefit of highlighting one of the more interesting ironies of Ameri-
can constitutional development.  As we shall see, evangelical proponents of 
moral agency, in an effort to strengthen the nation’s commitment to morals 
regulation, inadvertently laid the philosophical foundations for its ultimate 
abandonment. 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL ORDER: MORALITY WITHOUT AGENCY 
To early American legal commentators, the necessity of strict morals 
laws was self-evident.  Writing in the late 1820s, for example, Nathan Dane 
warned in his General Abridgment of American Law that no republic could 
long endure without “laws to prevent crimes against religion . . . and against 
morality.”16  Similarly, in his widely cited treatise on criminal law, the an-
tebellum commentator Joel Prentiss Bishop noted with pride that “morality” 
and “religion” were “objects of particular regard” to American law.17  And 
in as late as 1868, the influential judge and commentator Thomas M. Coo-
ley endorsed a range of invasive morals laws on the theory that “the preser-
vation of public morals is peculiarly subject to legislative supervision.”18 
That American criminal law should pay “particular” or “peculiar” at-
tention to moral and religious offenses followed from prevailing beliefs 
concerning the social foundations of republican government.  A succinct 
summary of this set of beliefs can be found in Judge James Kent’s famous 
opinion upholding the blasphemy conviction of John Ruggles.19  On appeal, 
Ruggles argued that the common law prohibition against blasphemy could 
not be enforced in New York since the state lacked an established religion.  
In response, Judge Kent reasoned that blasphemy was indictable at common 
law, not because of any harm done to the “rights of the church,” but because 
long experience had shown that permitting open criticism of Christianity 
“tend[ed] to corrupt the morals of the people, and to destroy [the] good or-
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der” upon which all republican governments depended.20  This, Judge Kent 
explained, was why American law took cognizance, not only of offenses 
against religion, but also of threats to prevailing sexual mores—from the 
publication of obscene literature to marital infidelity.21  In case empirical 
proof of the connection between irreligion and disorder were needed, Judge 
Kent reminded his readers that only once in modern history had a republic 
“hazarded” the “bold experiment” of dispensing with crimes against reli-
gion and morality.22  And the results of this experiment, reflected in the 
Reign of Terror, suggested that Americans would be wise to avoid the path 
of the French.23 
The crime of blasphemy was one piece of a larger complex of common 
law and statutory regulations that attacked moral deviance in the name of 
preserving republican liberty.  At the heart of this traditional moral order 
stood the legally enforced hierarchies that ordered the home, the workplace, 
and many other ostensibly private spheres.  In the eyes of the law, Ameri-
can society was composed not of coequal rights-bearing citizens, but of a 
dense network of relationships featuring dominant and subordinate part-
ners—husbands and wives, masters and servants, guardians and wards.  
Modern notions of personhood or moral autonomy were virtually unimagi-
nable in such a system, since the “liberty” of the dominant partner in a giv-
en hierarchy necessarily included the right to discipline the subordinate 
partner.  In addition, American criminal law recognized (and early com-
mentators enthusiastically endorsed) a range of status-based crimes, mostly 
inherited from English law, that applied to loosely defined classes of moral 
deviants.  In most states, individuals known by reputation to be vagrants or 
common prostitutes were subject to summary confinement, regardless of 
whether the commission of any particular act could be proven in court.  
Further, where specific deviant acts were not covered by existing statutes or 
precedents, local officials could usually reach the offender through flexible 
legal instruments, such as the common law misdemeanor and the power to 
abate public nuisances.24 
The most important point to note about the traditional moral order, 
however, is not that its understanding of privacy looks cramped by modern 
standards, but rather that it left little room for individual agency even in 
cases where citizens were acting in accordance with conventional moral 
precepts.  Stated differently, the traditional moral order—with its common 
law hierarchies, status-based crimes, and virtually unchecked local discre-
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 21.  Id.  
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tion—was ultimately less interested in eradicating sin than in maintaining 
order.  Individual agency in matters of morality, even when directed at 
curbing acknowledged evils, was a thing to be feared, since, by definition, it 
tended to erode the settled patterns of authority upon which the republican 
edifice was believed to rest. 
Consider the saga of John R. McDowall, the young Presbyterian min-
ister who in the early 1830s launched an ill-fated crusade to curb prostitu-
tion in New York City.  Working closely with the women of New York’s 
Third Presbyterian Church, McDowall made it his mission to “rescue” the 
prostitutes of the notorious Five Points neighborhood.  When relatively few 
women responded to his calls to repent and reform, McDowall decided to 
found a publication, McDowall’s Journal, that would make respectable 
New Yorkers aware of the evil enterprise in their midst.  The first issues of 
the Journal, which featured the addresses of the city’s known brothels, as 
well as thinly veiled descriptions of the upper class gentlemen known to 
frequent them, did indeed cause a stir.  But if the minister expected his fel-
low New Yorkers to reward his efforts, he had seriously misjudged public 
sentiment. 
Indeed, McDowall managed to publish only two issues before the pub-
lication was indicted as a public nuisance.  Far from applauding his attempt 
to curb sexual immorality, the grand jury, taking full advantage of the dis-
cretionary and local character of antebellum morals enforcement, charged 
the minister with using “the pretext of cautioning the young . . . against the 
temptations to immoral indulgence” to publish “odious and revolting” in-
formation that was “offensive to taste, injurious to morals, and degrading to 
the character of our city.”25  Nor did McDowall’s troubles end with the 
grand jury’s decision to abate his Journal.  The thirty-five-year-old was 
subsequently dismissed from his ministerial position, and he died shortly 
thereafter, his health apparently destroyed by the ordeal.26 
The deeper problem, of course, was that in attempting to stamp out 
acknowledged immoral behavior, McDowall and his army of female sup-
porters were also threatening the sexual autonomy of the city’s men, who 
were quite comfortable with vice so long as it was not practiced too openly.  
To the extent that McDowall’s and his supporters’ efforts chipped away at 
the unquestioned moral authority of the male head of the household, the an-
ti-prostitution crusaders were also eroding the “good order” upon which po-
litical society depended.27 
                                                          
 25.  John W. Kuykendall, Martyr to the Seventh Commandment: John R. McDowall, 50 J. 
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Something similar can of course be said of the countless female-led re-
form efforts that sprang up in the middle decades of the nineteenth centu-
ry—from the Female Moral Reform Society, which carried on McDowall’s 
anti-prostitution campaign following his death, to the “Women’s Crusade” 
of the mid-1870s, in which tens of thousands of women took to the streets 
in an effort to rid the land of Demon Rum.  Although these groups were act-
ing in the name of religious and moral principles that were widely shared—
at least among white, middle-class, native-born Protestants—their efforts 
were consistently hindered by the complex of laws and norms that defined 
the public sphere as an exclusively male domain.  Female reformers could 
pray to their hearts’ content, but attempts to chair public meetings—let 
alone exercise suffrage—initially met with stiff opposition, even from the 
men (and many women) who endorsed the reformers’ policy goals.  In the 
case of the Women’s Crusade, women forced their way into the all-male 
domain of the saloon, where they sang hymns and prayed for the souls of 
proprietors and patrons.  In some cities, the women had the implicit support 
of the authorities, but in others, pro-liquor officials took full advantage of 
the highly localized character of traditional morals enforcement, using their 
discretionary powers to arrest and try the protestors on vague charges rang-
ing from trespassing to disturbing the peace.28 
Clearly, traditional morals laws were at best an imperfect proxy for 
“true” morality.  But under the prevailing understanding of republican gov-
ernment, an imperfect proxy was preferable to the alternative of unfettered 
moral agency.  In order to explain the emergence of the modern right to pri-
vacy, we must first understand how this moral calculus came to be reversed.  
When and why did Americans begin to suspect that the social costs of sup-
pressing moral agency outweighed the benefits? 
II.  THE EVANGELICAL ORDER: AGENCY IN THE SERVICE OF MORALITY 
The origins of a shift in the prevailing conception of the law-morality 
relationship can be traced to the rise, in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, of a new popular theology.  During the wave of revivals known as 
the Second Great Awakening, Americans began to abandon the relatively 
orthodox Calvinism of the founding generation in favor of a militantly 
evangelical Protestantism that broke with the traditional theory of republi-
can government at three significant points. 
First, the new generation of evangelicals looked to the “enlightened 
public opinion” of the present, rather than the codified wisdom of the past, 
                                                          
 28.  See JACK S. BLOCKER, JR., “GIVE TO THE WINDS THY FEARS”: THE WOMEN’S 
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to discern the substantive content of public morality.29  Recall that, for 
Judge James Kent and other early legal commentators, common law rules 
and customary practices were valuable because they reflected the accumu-
lated knowledge of past generations with respect to the prerequisites of re-
publican liberty.  By contrast, the influential minister Lyman Beecher and 
other leading evangelicals cited the example of slavery to make the point 
that that “intrenched” institutions were as likely to shelter evil as to dis-
courage it.30  Indeed, Beecher and like-minded evangelicals came to believe 
that previous generations had tolerated, and in some cases endorsed, a range 
of activities and forms of property—liquor, lotteries, and slavery being the 
most prominent examples—that were properly condemned as “national 
sins.”31  Thus, while evangelicals enthusiastically supported efforts to po-
lice public morality, their conception of public morality was dynamic in na-
ture and reflected the evolving views of “enlightened” (read: white, native-
born, Protestant) society.32 
Second, many nineteenth-century evangelicals refused to accept that 
the primary end of morals enforcement should be the preservation of order, 
as opposed to the eradication of vice.  Breaking with orthodox Calvinism’s 
emphasis on human depravity, they stressed the possibility of moral perfec-
tion at both the individual and societal levels.  Moreover, they tended to 
adopt a post-millennial vision of the end times, according to which human 
effort would play a critical role in ushering in the Kingdom of Heaven; by 
spreading the Gospel and stamping out sin, both at home and abroad, Amer-
icans could hasten the Second Coming.33  Taken together, these convictions 
suggested that there was little point in worrying, as Judge James Kent and 
other early commentators had, that “radical experiments” in the realm of 
morals regulation would jeopardize the good order on which society de-
pended.34  Indeed, traditional morals laws, to the extent that the laws toler-
                                                          
 29.  LYMAN BEECHER, SIX SERMONS ON THE NATURE, OCCASIONS, SIGNS, EVILS AND 
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ated a modicum of vice in the name of preserving order, could only be 
viewed as affronts to the Almighty.35 
Finally, as suggested by the travails of John McDowall and the Wom-
en’s Crusaders, evangelical reformers tended to view individual agency, not 
as a dire threat to public order, but as the key to effective morals police.  In-
deed, many evangelicals began to suspect that the pillars of the traditional 
moral order—relational rights, status crimes, and local discretion—hindered 
the cause of moral improvement as often as they aided it.  Was it not the 
case, they asked, that women were frequently better exemplars of Christian 
morality than men?  And were not local officials, particularly in the nation’s 
increasingly machine-dominated cities, as likely to use their prerogatives to 
protect vice as to attack it?36 
But if the old methods of policing morality no longer sufficed, what 
was the alternative?  In his influential Six Sermons on Intemperance,37 Bee-
cher sketched a two-pronged reform strategy that would be followed, al-
most to the letter, by subsequent generations of evangelical reformers.  The 
first prong, not surprisingly, called for greater private agency in the policing 
of morality.  Primary responsibility for morals enforcement would shift 
from often corrupt and apathetic local officials to “voluntary associations” 
of committed Christians.  These bands of enlightened citizens would edu-
cate the public about the social costs of vice, organize boycotts of immoral 
businesses, root out lawbreakers within their communities, and expose mag-
istrates who refused to enforce the law.38 
The ecumenical American Temperance Society (“ATS”), which Bee-
cher cofounded in the late 1820s—and which quickly grew to a (reported) 
1.5 million members—provides an early example of the power of the vol-
untary association.39  An even more powerful example is the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union (“WCTU”).  An organizational outgrowth of 
the Women’s Crusade, the WCTU grew to become arguably the most influ-
ential grassroots membership organization of the late nineteenth century.40  
In keeping with the evangelical faith in citizen activism, groups like the 
WCTU pushed for reforms that empowered average citizens, including 
women, to play a more central role in policing morality.  One popular re-
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 60 (noting that God had not commanded America’s Christians merely to “hem in 
the army of the destroyer,” but rather “to turn [Satan] back and redeem the land”). 
 36.  Id. at 58.  As early as the mid-1820s, Beecher complained that, as a result of official in-
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statute-book.” 
 37.  Id. at 89–107. 
 38.  Id. at 89–98. 
 39.  MICHAEL P. YOUNG, BEARING WITNESS AGAINST SIN: THE EVANGELICAL BIRTH OF 
THE AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT 4 (2006).   
 40.  See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS 
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form, adopted in a handful of states, authorized women to sue the saloons 
into which their husbands’ paychecks disappeared.41  In other states, re-
formers rewrote the liquor laws to stipulate that no licenses would be grant-
ed unless a majority of women in a given county voted to approve them.42 
The second prong of the evangelical reform effort aimed to strip local 
officials of their broad discretionary powers via laws that imposed a uni-
form moral code on all Americans—or, failing this, all of the residents of a 
given state, county, or city.  The push for universal prohibitory laws was 
motivated by both theological and practical concerns.  From a theological 
point of view, such laws reflected the divine command to purify the land in 
preparation for Christ’s return.  But evangelicals were also keenly aware 
that technological change was rendering traditional morals laws increasing-
ly obsolete.  The advent of national transportation networks and improved 
methods of transportation, for example, meant that even well-meaning state 
and local officials were increasingly incapable of stemming the flow of 
“immoral” goods into their respective jurisdictions.  For this reason, Bee-
cher declared in 1827, citizen morality would henceforth have to be secured 
through methods that were “universal, operating permanently at all times 
and in all places.”43 
Writing in the mid-1820s, Beecher hoped that the nation’s Christians, 
once sufficiently educated about the evils of the liquor traffic, would use 
“the suffrage” to eradicate “ardent spirits” from the “list of lawful articles of 
commerce.”44  And indeed, evangelical reformers succeeded in enacting 
dozens of statewide prohibition laws during two waves of activity, the first 
coming in the 1850s, and the second around the turn of the twentieth centu-
ry.  An even more striking example of the push for “universal” remedies 
can be seen in Anthony Comstock’s successful crusade to modernize the 
vague and sporadically enforced common law rules concerning obscenity, 
contraception, and abortion.  During a flurry of lobbying activity that began 
in the late 1860s and lasted a little more than a decade, Comstock and his 
financial backers in the Young Men’s Christian Association (“YMCA”) 
convinced Congress and most of the states to adopt strict anti-obscenity 
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measures that came to be known as “Comstock Laws.”45  Although the pre-
cise content of the laws varied from state to state, the aim was to eradicate a 
thriving traffic in “obscene” material—an expansive category that Com-
stock interpreted to include not only pornography, but also contraceptive 
devices, sex education tracts, and the advertisements of abortion provid-
ers.46 
At first glance, the two prongs of evangelical reform—universal pro-
hibitory laws and enhanced individual agency—may appear to be in ten-
sion.  Most evangelicals, however, viewed them as complementary.  That is 
to say, the reformers were not so naïve as to believe that national or 
statewide prohibitory laws would successfully eradicate vice absent the on-
going enforcement efforts of vigilant private citizens, acting in a semi-
official capacity.  Thus Comstock’s anti-obscenity campaign, conducted 
under the auspices of the U.S. Postal Service, relied heavily on the volun-
teers and paid agents of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice 
(“NYSSV”).47  Because machine politicians were as likely to shelter vice as 
attack it, Comstock insisted that the enactment of strict “modern” morals 
laws made the private enforcement efforts of groups like the NYSSV and 
YMCA all the more essential.48 
A serious problem with conventional accounts of the origins of mod-
ern privacy is that they wrongly posit an all-or-nothing struggle between 
proponents of public morals regulation, on the one hand, and advocates of 
the Millean ideal of individual autonomy, on the other.  In reality, relatively 
few nineteenth or early twentieth century Americans questioned the need 
for vigorous regulation of public morality.  Notwithstanding the efforts of a 
handful of vocal atheists and free love advocates, a strong case can be made 
that the more developmentally significant conflict in this period pitted the 
traditional theory of republican government, reflected in Judge Kent’s Rug-
gles opinion, against the emerging evangelical public theology, with its em-
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phasis on moral perfection, universal prohibition, and enhanced individual 
agency. 
III.  MORAL AGENCY IN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 
To be sure, one can find influential statements of the autonomy ideal 
in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal opinions and treatises.  
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Campbell,49 
which invalidated an ordinance that prohibited the private possession and 
use of liquor, represents one well-known example.  The Kentucky Court, in 
fact, went so far as to cite Mill’s harm principle as an authoritative state-
ment of the scope of individual liberty under that state’s constitution.50  And 
among legal commentators, Christopher Tiedeman argued as early as 1886 
that mere “vices”—immoral acts which did “damage [only] to one’s self,” 
or whose effects on society were remote and uncertain—were beyond the 
constitutional limits of state power.51 
Still, there is reason to believe that a single-minded focus on these ear-
ly intimations of the modern autonomy ideal has blinded scholars to the ar-
guably more profound developmental impact of the evangelical conception 
of moral agency.  In particular, it is worth noting that many post-Civil War 
legal commentators were both highly critical of existing morals laws and 
rudely dismissive of the Millean conception of autonomy (with which they 
were quite familiar).  Consider Theodore D. Woolsey, the longtime presi-
dent of Yale—and nephew of Timothy Dwight—who in 1877 published a 
lengthy treatise on the practical and philosophical limits of state power.  
Going where few prior commentators had dared to venture, Woolsey’s Po-
litical Science frankly posed the question: “If you make the state a legislator 
on moral subjects, where can you stop?”52  But while Woolsey was highly 
critical of existing morals laws, he refused to endorse Mill’s revolutionary 
suggestion that all consensual and self-regarding acts were beyond the legit-
imate reach of social coercion.  The state, he insisted, “was a body built on 
morality,” and laws against polygamy and other gross affronts to public 
morality could be justified in the name of social cohesion.53 
Even more revealing, however, is that Woolsey disagreed with Mill on 
the question of precisely where the traditional morals regime went wrong.  
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Where Mill favored greater moral autonomy on the grounds that it would 
foster “individuality” and “experiments in living,” Woolsey advocated legal 
reform for the very different reason that he hoped to cultivate a deeper, 
more genuine adherence to conventional religious and moral precepts.54  On 
this basis, he argued for reforms, such as allowing women to take legal ac-
tion against the saloons that served their alcoholic husbands, that would 
shift some degree of moral agency from the heads of households to wives 
and dependents.55  He also attacked the double standard in prostitution en-
forcement on the grounds that it was both unfair to female prostitutes and 
obviously ineffective in curbing male demand.56  One might say, then, that 
Woolsey accepted one of Mill’s central complaints with respect to the tradi-
tional morals regime—that it was a net negative in terms of social utility—
but drew from this the polar opposite policy conclusion: not that society 
should abandon the attempt to police “private” vice, but that it should adopt 
reforms that would bring about an even closer correspondence of law and 
morality. 
Even Tiedeman, whose distinction between crime and vice appears to 
have been modeled on Mill’s harm principle, included in his list of “crimes” 
a number of acts, such as blasphemy and polygamy, that did not violate the 
rights of any particular individual, but rather offended “the sensibility of the 
public” or were “destructive of public morals.”57  In fact, it is at least argu-
able that Tiedeman’s main complaint about the traditional moral order was 
not that it aimed to impose a uniform moral code on American society, but 
rather, that its methods were crude and inefficient.  They subjected individ-
uals to arbitrary authority, and for reasons that contributed little to the ulti-
mate end of cultivating a moral citizenry.  For example, the enormous dis-
cretion that vaguely drafted vagrancy laws conferred upon local officials 
meant that almost anyone could, in theory, be charged with a morals of-
fense.  What was worse, status-based crimes foreclosed the possibility of 
reform.  Such laws reversed the presumption of innocence, requiring those 
charged to prove that they were not prostitutes or idlers, with evidence of 
past misconduct essentially dispositive.58 
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Turning to the case law, one can see the impact of the moral agency 
idea in two lines of state appellate decisions in which judges set aside tradi-
tional morals laws, not because they impinged upon an inviolable sphere of 
private liberty, but rather because they interfered with efforts to cultivate a 
deeper adherence to evangelical moral precepts.  The first line of decisions 
involves state laws and ordinances banning women from saloons and other 
drinking establishments.  Such ordinances were common in the nineteenth 
century and reflected the law’s generally paternalistic attitude towards 
women.59  Still, from the late 1860s to the early 1900s, state appellate 
courts heard a number of constitutional challenges, some framed in the lan-
guage of due process, others in the language of personal liberty, and still 
others in the language of equal protection.  And although most of these 
challenges failed, some succeeded—and for reasons that are directly perti-
nent to the present analysis. 
Consider State v. Nelson,60 an Idaho case involving a saloon owner 
who was convicted of violating a Boise ordinance that made it a crime to 
“permit females to enter” or “remain in” a drinking establishment.  On ap-
peal, defendant’s counsel pressed all three lines of argument described 
above.  But the Idaho Supreme Court, while agreeing that the ordinance 
was unconstitutional, did not fault the city for its paternalistic attitude to-
wards women, nor for the facially discriminatory nature of the ordinance; in 
fact, it declared it the “duty” of city officials to prohibit “immoral women 
from frequenting [drinking] places.”61  The chief problem with the ordi-
nance was, rather, that its broad language made no reference to the purpose 
of a woman’s visit.  Under the ordinance, any woman who set foot in a 
drinking establishment, regardless of her reasons for doing so, was liable to 
arrest.  This meant that an “orderly, well-behaved woman” who ventured 
into a saloon “in search of a recreant husband or a wayward son” was as li-
able to punishment as the “immoral woman” who went there “for the pur-
pose of drinking, engaging in games, [or] soliciting trade.”62  That the ordi-
nance was unreasonable, then, followed from the fact that in at least some 
cases it would work against its stated purposes.  The effect of barring all 
women from saloons would be to allow men to escape the influence of the 
very citizens—their wives and mothers—who were most directly interested 
in preventing breaches of morality. 
Nelson marks an important turning point in that the court refused to 
accept that laws confining women to the private sphere of the home were 
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necessarily related to the protection of public morality, or that the mainte-
nance of the hierarchical family structure was always a worthy end in itself, 
irrespective of its immediate moral effects.  It is also important to remember 
that the court’s concerns about the moral effects of the Boise ordinance 
were not purely hypothetical.  The decision came, as we have already seen, 
at the end of a forty-year period of intense activism on the part of evangeli-
cal women opposed to the liquor traffic.  Many of the foot soldiers of the 
Women’s Crusade, who had dared to invade the all-male province of the 
saloon, had spent time in jail as a result.  And only four years before the 
Nelson decision, Carry A. Nation had rocketed to national stardom follow-
ing a spectacular string of saloon-smashing episodes, for which she, too, 
had spent considerable time in jail.63 
Whether the members of the Idaho court supported these unconven-
tional efforts to rein in vice is difficult to determine.  But the notion that 
women were uniquely well suited to the task of civilizing male relatives and 
closing down saloons and other immoral haunts was, by the turn of the cen-
tury, widely accepted by male Protestant elites.64  In any event, a consensus 
soon developed in the state courts concerning laws that regulated the pres-
ence of women in drinking establishments: ordinances that were narrowly 
targeted at women who worked, loitered, or drank in saloons were “reason-
able” regulations of public morality, but ordinances that were so loosely 
drawn as to restrict the liberties of morally upstanding women were “unrea-
sonable” and therefore unconstitutional.65 
The idea of moral agency also figures prominently in a related line of 
decisions in which laws that criminalized mere “association” with immoral 
persons were struck down as “unreasonable” police regulations.  In City of 
Watertown v. Christnacht,66 for example, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
invalidated an ordinance that imposed a fine and jail time upon any “male 
person” who was found to be “associating” with a “known or reputed” pros-
titute.67  The court reasoned that the ordinance was in conflict with a state 
constitutional provision that protected citizens’ “inherent rights” of “enjoy-
ing . . . life and liberty . . . and the pursuit of happiness.”68  But it was not 
the liberty of reputed prostitutes or their male customers that concerned the 
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court.  Rather, it was the liberty of ministers and other morally upstanding 
citizens who might undertake to rescue and reform the town’s prostitutes.  
“To sustain the validity of the . . . ordinance,” the court warned, would be to 
“prevent personal effort on the part of male citizens to uplift and ameliorate 
the condition of fallen women.  Ministers of the gospel, physicians, nurses, 
welfare workers—all would be subject to . . . the pains and penalties of the 
ordinance.”69 
A law that barred all men from associating with known prostitutes was 
unreasonable, then, in the sense that it worked against the state’s purported 
goal of cultivating a moral citizenry.  To be sure, the court acknowledged 
that the discretionary authority of police officers and prosecutors would, in 
most cases, leave ministers and welfare workers free to do their work.  But 
this was irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry, since “the constitutionality 
of a law” was “determined, not alone by what has been done, but by what 
may be done, under its provisions.”70 
As these decisions make clear, the notion of “reasonableness” often 
functioned as a proxy for moral agency.  In many late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century cases, police regulations were deemed unreasonable, not 
because they were overly restrictive of personal liberty in the abstract, but 
because they were overly restrictive of the personal liberty of morally up-
standing citizens—that is, citizens who were acting in accordance with the 
norms of white, middle-class, Protestant society.  In these decisions we see 
clearly the impact of a neglected third strand of American le-
gal/constitutional thought—a strand that rejects both the logic of the well-
ordered society, with its emphasis on local discretion and hierarchy, and the 
logic of Millean autonomy. 
                                                          
 69.  Christnacht, 164 N.W. at 62. 
 70.  Id.  For similar decisions striking down “unreasonable” morals laws, see In Re Ah Jow, 
29 F. 181, 182 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (noting that an ordinance criminalizing an individual’s mere 
presence in an opium den would prevent upstanding citizens from “transact[ing] . . . legitimate 
business” and carrying out “the ordinary and proper purposes of life”); Hechinger v. City of 
Maysville, 57 S.W. 619 (Ky. 1900) (invalidating an ordinance that barred women from associating 
with known prostitutes, while permitting male relatives to do so); City of Grand Rapids v. New-
ton, 69 N.W. 84, 85 (Mich. 1896) (noting that an ordinance punishing business owners who per-
mitted “disorderly” persons to congregate in their establishments would “render subject to its pro-
visions those maintaining a reformatory home for inebriates or prostitutes”); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 
44 N.W. 579, 583 (Mich. 1889) (striking down a vaguely worded vagrancy ordinance that threat-
ened to place “even the most respectable lady in the land under the surveillance of policemen” and 
to impugn “the character and reputation of the most virtuous woman”); City of San Antonio v. 
Salvation Army, 127 S.W. 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), writ refused (overturning an ordinance 
blocking the construction of a home for reformed prostitutes in part on the grounds that it was “not 
the policy of the law to throw obstacles in the path of reformation”). 
 378 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:362 
IV.  BEYOND COMSTOCKERY: “THAT TRADITION IS A LIVING THING” 
The assault on the so-called Comstock Laws began in the early dec-
ades of the twentieth century, when birth control advocates, civil libertari-
ans, and some medical professionals began to question the wisdom (and 
constitutionality) of making criminals out of those who sought to dissemi-
nate contraceptives and sexually themed literature.71  As is usually the case 
in reform movements, the enemies of “Comstockery” attacked the existing 
order from a variety of angles, and, indeed, the ideal of sexual autonomy 
played a key role in their efforts.72  Still, it seems clear that the logic of 
moral agency was, more often than not, at the heart of the landmark judicial 
rulings that ultimately dismantled the post-Civil War morals regime.  In a 
great many cases, the censors were enjoined, not because they were pre-
venting Americans from living out their own unique beliefs concerning 
contraception and sex, but because they were interfering with what judges 
considered to be well-intentioned, if unconventional, efforts to promote 
public morality. 
The Second Circuit’s landmark obscenity ruling in United States v. 
Dennett73 offers a striking example of how the logic of moral agency could 
be turned against the very laws it had once helped to justify. The case began 
when the sex educator and birth control advocate Mary Ware Dennett was 
convicted under the federal Comstock Law of sending an obscene publica-
tion—an educational pamphlet entitled “The Sex Side of Life”—through 
the U.S. mail.  Dennett’s conviction generated an enormous amount of me-
dia attention—almost all of it critical of the jury’s finding that Dennett’s 
pamphlet fit the statutory definition of “obscenity.”74  Most of the criticism 
focused on two specific aspects of the case.  First, commentators noted that 
“The Sex Side of Life” had received endorsements from a range of state and 
local public health agencies, as well as from private religious organizations.  
Even the YMCA, the group that had led the charge for anti-obscenity laws 
in the 1870s, sold Ware’s pamphlet through its bookstores.  To label as “ob-
scene” a tract that was in widespread use among respectable society 
seemed, to many commentators, patently absurd.75  Second, commentators 
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viewed Dennett’s conviction as evidence that enforcement of the federal 
obscenity law was an arbitrary and even vindictive business.  To many, it 
seemed likely that federal officials had taken advantage of the law’s vague 
wording to punish Dennett for her public attacks on the Postal Service’s 
policies with respect to contraception and sexually themed material.76 
On appeal, Judge Augustus Hand ruled that “The Sex Side of Life” did 
not, in fact, fall within the statutory definition of obscenity.77  Judge Hand’s 
opinion, which pioneered the idea that a potentially obscene work should be 
evaluated in terms of its dominant theme, broke with the more restrictive 
“Hicklin Test,” thus paving the way for a line of decisions that vastly ex-
panded Americans’ access to sexually themed art and literature.78  For pre-
sent purposes, however, the more salient point is that Judge Hand’s opinion 
closely tracked the logic of evangelical moral agency.  Although he did not 
dispute the federal government’s power to criminalize the dissemination of 
obscene material, Judge Hand insisted on interpreting the term “obscenity” 
in light of contemporary public opinion.  It was true that, under the “old 
theory” of Comstock’s day, Americans had believed that education “about 
sex matters should be left to chance” and cloaked in “mystery and reti-
cence.”79  But by 1930, most Americans no longer regarded educational 
tracts “fairly . . . calculated to aid parents in the instruction of their children 
in sex matters” as beyond the pale.80  In case empirical evidence of this shift 
was needed, Justice Hand cited the recent publication, by the U.S. Public 
Health Service, of a pamphlet entitled “Sex Education”—a development 
that would have been unimaginable under the “old theory.”81 
It was also clear, at least to Judge Hand, that suppressing a soberly 
worded educational pamphlet was unreasonable, in the sense that it contrib-
uted nothing to the “general objects aimed at” by the statute.82  Indeed, if 
the statute’s purpose had been to curb illicit sexual desires, then the effects 
of suppressing “The Sex Side of Life” could only be described as perverse.  
In the absence of “intelligent and high-minded sources” of information, 
children would be left to “grope about in mystery and morbid curiosity . . . 
secur[ing] such information, as they may be able to obtain, from ill-
informed and . . . foul-mouthed companions.”83  The “direct aim and net re-
sult” of Dennett’s pamphlet, then, was not to “arouse sex impulses,” but ra-
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ther to promote the type of “understanding and self-control” that were es-
sential to the cultivation of a moral citizenry.84 
Given that Dennett and its progeny are typically classified as speech 
cases, one may wonder what connects them to the Supreme Court’s land-
mark sexual privacy rulings of the 1960s and 1970s.  The answer is that 
Dennett—the case that struck the first significant blow against a federal 
Comstock Law—established a template that could be used to challenge the 
entire complex of state and federal Comstock Laws.  If the content of public 
morality was to be derived from contemporary public opinion, and if morals 
laws were not to be enforced in ways that unreasonably worked against the 
state’s purported objective of cultivating a moral citizenry, then a law that 
denied married couples access to contraception was every bit as vulnerable 
to these objections as a law criminalizing the mailing of an educational 
pamphlet. 
Indeed, although most of the scholarly commentary on Poe v. 
Ullman85 and Griswold v. Connecticut86 has focused on the Justices’ com-
peting theories of substantive due process, it is worth noting that both Jus-
tice Harlan’s influential dissent in Poe and Justice Douglas’s majority opin-
ion in Griswold followed the basic contours of Judge Hand’s Dennett 
opinion.  In Poe, after explicitly affirming the state’s right to regulate at 
least some “consensual” sexual behavior, Justice Harlan concluded that 
Connecticut’s contraception ban was nonetheless unconstitutional.87  The 
problem, as in Dennett, was that the state had employed an overly broad 
means (a complete ban on the use of contraception) that lacked the backing 
of—and, indeed, flew in the face of—a public consensus that viewed con-
traceptive use as positively beneficial, at least within the context of mar-
riage.  To be sure, judges were to be guided by “tradition” when consider-
ing whether particular acts were constitutionally protected under the Due 
Process Clause.  But the tradition in question was “a living thing.”88  It re-
flected the current “balance struck by this country” between “liberty and the 
demands of organized society,” “having regard to what history teaches are 
the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which 
it broke.”89  Viewed in this light, the underlying assumption of “the so-
called Comstock Law”—that the use of contraceptives by married couples 
posed a threat to public morals—could only be regarded as a relic of a “by-
gone day.”90 
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But Justice Harlan, following Judge Hand, also identified a second 
flaw in the Connecticut statute: its real-world effects were in conflict with 
the state’s purported aim of curbing extramarital sexual conduct and its as-
sociated social harms.  To be sure, Justice Harlan agreed that the states 
should make every effort to “foster[] and protect[]” the institution of mar-
riage.91  But the institution of marriage presupposed a considerable degree 
of autonomy on the part of those who embraced it, and it was unlikely to 
flourish where “the whole machinery of the criminal law” was inserted “in-
to the very heart of marital privacy, requiring husband and wife to render 
account before a criminal tribunal of their uses of that intimacy.”92  Simply 
put, a law that would have the practical effect of eviscerating an institution 
could not reasonably be described as protecting or fostering that same insti-
tution. 
It is worth noting that Justice Douglas, in a separate Poe dissent, did 
attack the Connecticut law on explicitly Millean grounds, citing On Liberty 
on the dangers of permitting “intolerant groups” to stifle “experimentation” 
in the realms of sex and contraception.93  And yet, four years later, when he 
found himself in the position of authoring an opinion striking down Con-
necticut’s contraception ban, Justice Douglas conspicuously eschewed the 
Millean justification on which he had so recently relied.  Instead of faulting 
Connecticut for imposing a uniform moral code on the state’s citizens, Jus-
tice Douglas’s Griswold opinion objected only to the fact that the regulatory 
means employed by the state “swe[pt] unnecessarily broadly.”94  Echoing 
Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent, he pointed out that enforcement of the contra-
ception ban would exert “a maximum destructive impact upon” the very in-
stitution that the state was ostensibly attempting to protect.95  In short, Con-
necticut’s decision to deny married couples access to contraception, like the 
federal government’s earlier suppression of a high-minded educational 
tract, was not only out of step with contemporary opinion but also impossi-
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 93.  Id. at 514, 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Indeed, Douglas went so far as to declare that 
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affirming that the constitutionality of criminal laws targeting adultery and fornication was “be-
yond doubt,” nonetheless found that the contraception ban “swe[pt] unnecessarily broadly, reach-
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ble to reconcile with the state’s acknowledged interest in cultivating a moral 
citizenry. 
It is often noted that the Court’s privacy jurisprudence has in the years 
since Griswold splintered into three relatively distinct strands.96  At times, 
the Court has defined the right to privacy as extending only to practices that 
are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.”97  On other occa-
sions it has grounded its rulings, at least in part, on the contemporary or 
“emerging” values of American society—as when Justice Kennedy invoked 
“the laws and traditions [of] the past half century” in the process of invali-
dating Texas’s criminal ban on sodomy.98  On still other occasions, the 
Court has employed the unvarnished language of Millean autonomy, en-
dorsing the “right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe.”99 
To some observers, the shifting foundations of the Court’s privacy rul-
ings, as well as the mingling of arguably contradictory principles within 
single opinions, are clear signs of a judiciary determined to impose its own 
(elite, liberal, secular) values on American society.  Thus, in his Lawrence 
dissent, Justice Scalia read Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, with its al-
ternating references to the citizen’s “autonomy of self” and the “emerging” 
views of society, as a policy preference in search of a principle.100  The 
Lawrence majority, Scalia complained, was enmeshed in a “law-profession 
culture” that was bent on advancing “the so-called homosexual agenda,” 
with or without the aid of a coherent conception of constitutional privacy.101  
The evidence surveyed above suggests, however, that morals laws of the 
sort invalidated in Lawrence have coexisted uneasily with competing ideals 
of moral agency and autonomy for more than a century.  The roots of the 
oft-noted tensions in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence thus run far deeper 
than Justice Scalia supposed. 
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